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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dean Allen Harrell appeals from the district court's order denying his 
petition to perform post-conviction DNA testing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying criminal case are as set forth by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in State v. Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749, p.1 
(Idaho App. July 25, 2001): 
On July 30, 1998, a Cassia County sheriff's officer was 
dispatched to the residence of S.K. Upon entering the residence, 
the officer observed that S.K.'s eyes were black and swollen, that 
her lips were puffy, that she had blood on her arms and hands, that 
there was blood on the floor, bed, and walls, and that a number of 
items in the residence were broken. S.K. told the officer that she 
had been beaten and raped. 
Harrell was arrested the next day and charged with rape and burglary. !g. 
At trial, the state presented the following evidence: 
A friend of the victim testified at trial that she, Harrell, and a 
number of other people arrived at the victim's home at 
approximately 1 :30 a.m. on the morning of July 30, 1998. She 
testified that Harrell had been wearing a tank top, faded blue 
wrangler jeans, scruffy cowboy boots, and a green ball cap. 
Finally, the friend testified that Harrell remained at the victim's 
home after she and most of the other people left at approximately 
3:00 a.m. 
Another friend of the victim testified at trial that she returned 
to the victim's home and knocked on the front door. She testified 
that a man walked out, shut and locked the door behind him, and 
said that the victim was asleep. Although she did not notice the 
man's face, the friend testified that she knew the man as Harrell 
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because he was wearing the same clothing that she saw him 
wearing earlier that night. She further testified that Harrell ran very 
quickly to his truck and sped off without turning on his headlights. 
Finally, the friend testified that she continued to knock and that 
when the victim answered the door, she was "bare naked, bloody, 
and beat" and yelling that she had just been raped. 
One of the officers testified at trial that he first confronted 
Harrell in the parking lot of a local cafe on the following day. Harrell 
agreed to talk to the police and led them back to his residence 
where Harrell agreed to let the officers look around. The officer 
observed that Harrell was wearing a pair of blue Wrangler Jeans 
which appeared to be stained with blood. In Harrell's residence, 
the officer discovered a pair of lace-up leather boots and a light-
colored tank top which also appeared to be stained with blood. 
Harrell admitted that he had been wearing the pants, the lace-up 
boots, and the tank top on the previous night. The officer asked if 
he could take Harrell's pants for testing, and Harrell agreed. When 
Harrell removed his pants, the officer discovered that Harrell's 
underwear was also stained with blood. Harrell admitted that he 
had worn the underwear on the previous night. Harrell voluntarily 
gave his underwear to the officer. 
A sample of blood found on Harrell's underwear was DNA 
tested by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement. A criminalist 
for the department testified at trial that the results of the DNA 
testing excluded Harrell as the source of the blood. The criminalist 
testified that the results showed, however, that the victim was a 
potential source of the blood. 
The officer also testified that Harrell agreed to meet the 
officers at their office for further questioning. The officer observed 
that there were numerous "fresh" scrapes and cuts on Harrell's 
hands, which the officer believed were the result of hitting 
somebody in the teeth. During the interview, Harrell admitted to 
having sex with the victim and stated that "everything was going 
good and then it turned to shit." Harrell also stated that he didn't 
know how things got out of hand, that he didn't realize that he hit 
her that hard, and that he hated going to jail for something he didn't 
mean to do. Following the interview, Harrell completed a written 
statement in which he stated, "Everything was going good, and the 
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next minute, everything got out of hand, and she started telling me 
she didn't want to. She wanted to go to bed, and that is when it got 
out of control." 
Id. at 3-4. A jury found Harrell guilty of rape but acquitted him of burglary. !Q. at 
2. The district court imposed a unified life sentence, with twenty-five years fixed. 
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Harrell's conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal. kl 
Harrell then filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that 
he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See Harrell v. 
State, 2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 405A, p.3 (Idaho App. May 14, 2004). The 
district court denied Harrell's petition after an evidentiary hearing, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed. See id. 
Harrell then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, again 
claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See Harrell v. 
State, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 400, p.1 (Idaho App. March 19, 2008). He 
also filed a motion to disqualify the judge presiding over the post-conviction 
petition proceedings. See id. The trial court summarily dismissed Harrell's 
petition on the ground that it was untimely, without first ruling on Harrell's motion 
to disqualify. See id. The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal, holding 
that the district judge was without authority to dismiss the petition or to take any 
other action in the case before first ruling on the motion to disqualify. kl at 1-3. 
In the interim, the motion to disqualify was rendered moot by the death of 
the sitting district court judge. See Harrell v. State, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 638, p.2 (Idaho App. September 9, 2010). On remand, the district court 
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again dismissed Harrell's petition as untimely. lsL The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed. lsL at 2-5. 
Harrell next filed another post-conviction petition which contained various 
allegations and requested additional DNA testing of evidence associated with his 
conviction. (R., pp.14-24.) The district court appointed counsel to represent 
Harrell. (R., p.25.) Appointed counsel filed an amended petition seeking new 
DNA testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b).1 (R., pp.49-93.) The petition included 
an affidavit from a biologist explaining that while previous DNA testing on 
Harrell's underwear revealed the victim as a possible source of the major DNA 
profile, the testing utilized at that time could only identify a DNA profile with a 
possible frequency of 1 in 1,900 individuals. (R., p.57.) However, modern short 
tandem repeat (STR) DNA analysis could match a forensic sample to a single 
individual with a match probability of 1 in quadrillions. (Id.) 
The district court denied Harrell's petition. (R., pp.184-193.) The court 
concluded that even assuming that the result of new DNA testing would exclude 
the victim as a contributor to the blood found on Harrell's underwear, such 
evidence would not show that it was more likely than not that Harrell was 
1 Harrell initially requested DNA testing on "blood found on his underwear, blood 
from [his] jeans, rape kit vaginal swabs of victim, pubic hairs which may have 
been collected from victim (if any), and fingernail scrapings taken from victim (if 
any.)" (R., p.51.) However, after it was discovered that some of this evidence 
had been destroyed (R., pp.106-107), the district court construed Harrell's 
. subsequent supporting memorandum as narrowing his request to include only 
new DNA testing on his underwear, of which the state still retained custody. (R., 
p.190 n.1.) On appeal, Harrell has not challenged the district court's 
interpretation of his request, and has limited his argument to whether Harrell was 
entitled to additional DNA testing of his underwear. (See generally Appellant's 
brief.) 
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innocent in light of the other evidence of Harrell's guilt presented at trial. (Id.) 
Harrell timely appealed. (R., pp.205-207.) 
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ISSUE 
Harrell states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying DNA testing of the blood 
stain and summarily dismissing the petition? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Harrell failed to show that the district court erred in denying his post-
conviction petition for DNA testing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Harrell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Dismissing His 
Petition For Post-Conviction DNA Testing 
A. Introduction 
Harrell contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction DNA testing. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) Specifically, Harrell 
contends that the district court erred in concluding that the requested DNA 
testing did not have the scientific potential to provide evidence that would show 
that it was more probable than not that Harrell was innocent of the rape. (Id.) 
However, a review of the record supports the district court's ruling. Even if 
new DNA testing excluded the victim as a source of the blood found on the 
underwear Harrell was wearing the day after the rape, such evidence would have 
limited exculpatory value. The mere absence of the victim's DNA on Harrell's 
underwear would not point to another perpetrator, conclusively remove Harrell 
from the scene of the crime, or overcome strong evidence of Harrell's guilt, 
including his confessions. 
In addition, the known results of the previous DNA testing performed on 
Harrell severely limit the likelihood that any new DNA evidence would even be 
exculpatory. In applying I.C. § 19-4902, this Court may consider the likelihood 
that any DNA testing would not be favorable to Harrell. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied § 19-4902 And Denied Harrell's Post-
Conviction DNA Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4902 permits an individual to petition for the post-
conviction DNA testing of evidence which was secured in relation to the trial 
which resulted in his conviction. Among other things, I.C. § 19-4902 requires a 
petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to 
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable 
than not that the petitioner is innocent." I.C. § 19-4902(e)(1). The Idaho 
appellate courts have not yet had the occasion to analyze this materiality 
requirement of I.C. § 19-4902 
In this case, the district court denied Harrell's petition after correctly 
concluding that, in light of the strength of the evidence presented against Harrell 
at trial, additional DNA testing on the underwear he was wearing the day after the 
rape would not show that it was more probable than not that Harrell was 
innocent, even assuming DNA test results excluded the victim as a contributor. 
(R., pp.184-193.) This Court may affirm the district court's denial of Harrell's 
petition exclusively on this basis. 
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However, the state additionally submits that I.C. § 19-4902 does not 
require a court to assume DNA results most favorable to the petitioner in 
analyzing a post-conviction DNA testing request. Instead, the statute permits 
district courts to consider the likelihood that DNA testing will produce a result 
favorable to a petitioner, especially where, as here, DNA testing had already 
been conducted on the evidence in question. Harrell failed to show a reasonable 
probability that any new DNA testing would have been exculpatory, and thus, 
failed to show that it was more probably than not that he was innocent. This 
Court may affirm the district court's denial of Harrell's petition on this alternative 
basis. 
1. Harrell Has Failed To Establish That Favorable DNA Test 
Results Would Have Shown That It Was More Likely Than 
Not He Is Innocent Of The Rape 
As discussed above, the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902 requires 
a petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to 
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable 
than not that the petitioner is innocent." 
In analyzing whether Harrell made the materiality showing required by I.C. 
§ 19-4902 in this case, the district court weighed the evidence of Harrell's guilt 
presented at trial, and the potential exculpatory value of the DNA testing results, 
assuming results favorable to Harrell. (R., pp.184-193.) The court first 
recognized that DNA test results favorable to Harrell could only reveal the 
absence of the victim's DNA on his underwear. (R., pp.184-193.) This type of 
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result would be of limited exculpatory value because it would not point to an 
alternative perpetrator or remove Harrell from the scene of the crime. 
The court then reviewed the evidence presented against Harrell at trial. 
(Id.) At trial, a video of Detective Randy Kidd's interview with Harrell was entered 
into evidence (#25985 Trial Tr.,2 p.97, L.13 - p.100, L.11.) The Idaho Court of 
Appeals described the contents of the interview in its opinion affirming Harrell's 
conviction on direct appeal as follows: 
During the interview, Harrell admitted to having sex with the 
victim and stated that "everything was going good and then it 
turned to shit." Harrell also stated that he didn't know how things 
got out of hand, that he didn't realize that he hit her that hard, and 
that he hated going to jail for something he didn't mean to do. 
Following the interview, Harrell completed a written statement in 
which he stated, "Everything was going good, and the next minute, 
everything got out of hand, and she started telling me she didn't 
want to. She wanted to go to bed, and that is when it got out of 
control." 
Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749, p.4. 
On appeal, Harrell asserts his confession was false and that Detective 
Kidd engaged in coercive interview techniques. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) 
However, filing an I.C. § 19-4902 post-conviction DNA petition does not provide 
the petitioner the opportunity to re-litigate trial evidentiary issues. Harrell moved 
for the suppression of the interview video and his written confession prior to trial, 
but the district court denied the motion. (#25985, R., pp.21-24, 42-45.) Harrell 
did not challenge the admissibility of his confessions on direct appeal. See 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and 
Reporter's Transcript filed in Harrell's direct appeal No. 25985, State v. Harrell. 
(6/14/12 Order.) 
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Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749. For the purposes of the I.C. § 19-
4902 materiality requirement, the appropriate analysis evaluates what evidence 
was actually presented at trial. 
Harrell's confessions were corroborated by trial witness testimony. 
Witness Yvonne Vega testified that after meeting Harrell the night of the rape, 
she observed a man - whom she identified as Harrell by his clothing - leave the 
victim's house and quickly drive away in his truck with his headlights off. 
(#25985 Trial Tr., p.175, L.3 - p.180, L.1; p.192, L.20 - p.195, L.3.) Vega 
knocked on the victim's locked front door for some time before Harrell emerged. 
(#25985 Trial Tr, p.191, L.23 - p.192, L.19.) Vega testified that immediately 
thereafter, she discovered the victim inside the house, "naked, bloody and beat," 
and reporting that she had been raped. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.195, L.4 - p.197, 
L.20.) Jennifer Nanez corroborated Vega's account, but testified that she could 
not identify the man who fled the victim's house. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.252, L.25 -
p.257, L.1.) Celest Christiansen testified that she met Harrell the night of the 
rape, invited him to the victim's house, and became familiar with Harrell's truck 
after asking him to move it. (#25985 Trial Tr. p.150, L.24 - p.164, L.20.) She 
then testified that she saw Harrell's truck outside the victim's residence after she 
and several others temporarily left. (Id.) 
Detective Kidd testified that on the morning after the rape, he observed 
"numerous scrapes and cuts," on Harrell's hands, "one of which was still 
bleeding." (#25985 Trial Tr., p.103, L.8 - p.104, L.15.) Detective Kidd explained 
that these wounds caught his attention because they were "very fresh," and 
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consistent with injuries one would sustain by hitting someone in the teeth. (Id.) 
These injuries, and Detective Kidd's impression of them, were consistent with the 
victim's description of the rape. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.41, L.14 - p.42, L.13.) 
On appeal, Harrell finally contends that because "the scene of the rape 
was bloody," the absence of the victim's blood on Harrell's underwear would 
"show that [the rapist] was not Mr. Harrell." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, the 
mere absence of detectable victim's blood from Harrell's underwear, more than 
10 years after the rape, would have limited exculpatory value when weighed 
against Harrell's confessions and other evidence of his guilt. Harrell presented 
no particular analysis or sworn expert testimony regarding the likelihood that the 
victim's blood would be found on the rapist's underwear under the facts of this 
case. 
Harrell has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that 
even assuming DNA test results favorable to Harrell, such results did not have 
the scientific potential to produce new evidence showing that it was more 
probable than not that Harrell was innocent of the rape. This Court may affirm 
the district court's decision exclusively on this basis. 
2. Harrell Has Failed To Show That Additional DNA Testing On His 
Underwear Would Be Exculpatory 
While the district court chose to assume that the requested DNA testing 
would be favorable to Harrell, the statute did not require it do so. Idaho Code § 
19-4902 permits the court to consider the likelihood that the requested testing will 
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even result in exculpatory evidence, in determining whether the petitioner has 
met the materiality requirement. 
As discussed above, the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902 
requires a petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific 
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent." The plain language of this 
statute does not expressly require the court to assume exculpatory test results. 3 
If the Idaho legislature wished to remove the judicial determination of the 
likelihood of exculpatory results, it could have done so. 
In this case, previous DNA testing excluded Harrell as a source of the 
apparent blood stains found on his underwear. (#25985 Trial Tr. p.227, L.18 -
p.235, L.8.) Harrell has not argued that this test result is open to modification by 
new modern testing. The previous DNA testing also found that the victim shared 
3 This distinguishes I.C. § 19-4902 from the corresponding post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes of several other jurisdictions which do expressly require the 
district court to assume exculpatory results when analyzing whether a petitioner 
has made the required materiality showing. !;&_ Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-
413(1 )(a) (a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) 
"Favorable results of the DNA testing will demonstrate the petitioner's actual 
innocence"; Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 54-102kk(b)(1) (a court must order DNA testing if 
petitioner shows "[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not 
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained 
through DNA testing"); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1 (c)(3)(ii) (petitioner must 
present a prima facie case demonstrating that "DNA testing of the specific 
evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish" actual innocence or 
support a lesser sentence in a capital case); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(7)(1) 
(petitioner must show a "reasonable probability exists that the movant would not 
have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the 
requested DNA testing" (emphasis added)); see also Ind. Code§ 35-38-7-8(4); 
Ky. Rev. Stat.§ 422.285(5)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 176.0918(7)(a). 
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a DNA profile with the blood found on Harrell's underwear, and that only 1 in 
2,100 Caucasians share this profile. (Id.) 
In light of this previous testing, Harrell cannot show a reasonable 
probability that new DNA testing would even produce exculpatory results. Harrell 
thus cannot meet the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902, especially when 
these previous results are considered in conjunction with the evidence of 
Harrell's guilt presented at trial, and the fact that even favorable results would 
merely reveal only the absence of incriminating evidence. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902 does not require a district court to assume that the 
results of the requested DNA testing would be exculpatory when analyzing 
whether the petitioner has met the materiality requirement of that statute. In light 
of the previous DNA testing on his underwear, Harrell could not show a 
reasonable probability that new DNA testing would have a different result. This is 
a relevant factor in determining whether the results had "the scientific potential to 
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable 
than not that [Harrell] is innocent." This Court can affirm on this alternative basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Harrell's petition for post-conviction DNA testing. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON ' 
Deputy Attorney General 
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